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*CSR 381-1

CHIEF OF STAFF REGULATION)
NO. 381-1)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington, D. C., 21 September 1979

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

*Intelligence and Security Measures Applicable to Nationals
of Communist-Controlled Countries Entering the
United States as Nonimmigrant Aliens (U)*

1. (C) PURPOSE. [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (2)

2. (U) REFERENCES. AR 380-10, AR 380-25, AR 381-15, and DOD Directive C-3115.5.

3. (U) POLICY. United States policy favors interchanges of information and people, and the promotion of trade with all countries with which we have diplomatic relations. The United States has concluded exchanges and bilateral cooperative agreements with some Communist-controlled countries and conducts exchanges with others on an informal basis. It is in the national interest to conduct such exchanges and commercial contacts, including some in scientific and technical fields, on an equitable basis and without Government restraint provided the national security is not jeopardized.

4. (C) GUIDELINES. [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (2)

CLASSIFIED BY: ACSI, DA
REVIEW ON: 12 September 1999
REASON: 2-310c DOD 5200.1-R
1 2 (3) 4 (5) 6 7 8

*This regulation supersedes CSR 381-1, 9 May 1973.

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5 USC 552 (b) (4)

a. (U) Communist visits to the United States. Department of Defense (DOD) directives and regulations govern safeguarding of classified defense information and facilities at military and other Government installations, in industrial facilities, and other private institutions. Nationals of Communist-controlled countries may visit such a facility or institution provided they do not have access to areas where classified work is being performed, and it is determined that there is no risk of possible compromise of classified information or unauthorized transfer of unclassified technical data through observation, contact with personnel engaged in classified work, or other means. Normally, visits to facilities engaged solely or largely in nonmilitary activities will not be cause for objection, except where advanced scientific and technical data relating to materials or equipment being embargoed to the Soviet bloc and the PRC might be compromised.

b. (f)

5 USC 552 (b) (4)

c. (f)

(1) (f)

(2) (f)

5. (f) RESPONSIBILITIES.

5 USC 552 (b) (4)

a. (U) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) will--

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- (1) (U) Assure, and coordinate, DA participation in the program in accordance with this regulation.
- (2) (U) Provide a central DA contact point for East-West Exchange matters.
- (3) (U) Provide technical information, input to the DOD Alert List, guidance, and advice pertaining to specific cases as requested by Defense components. Designate a specific contact point to provide prompt and effective support for the formulation of positions with respect to visits by nationals of Communist-controlled countries to the United States.
- (4) (U) Formulate DA positions regarding proposed exchanges considering positive intelligence and technological gains or losses anticipated and installation and personnel security aspects.
- (5) (U) Provide a member to the Director of Central Intelligence Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) of the Intelligence Community.
 - b. (U) Army Staff agencies will provide technical information, guidance, and advice concerning specific exchange matters when requested by the ACSI.

(ACSI)

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

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McGinn
JOHN R. McGINN
Lieutenant General, GS
Director of the Army Staff

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